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Abstract
We study a network formation game where agents
receive benefits by forming connections to other
agents but also incur both direct and indirect costs
from the formed connections. Specifically, once the
agents have purchased their connections, an attack
starts at a randomly chosen vertex in the network
and spreads according to the independent cascade
model with a fixed probability, destroying any in-
fected agents. The utility or welfare of an agent in
our game is defined to be the expected size of the
agent’s connected component post-attackminus her
expenditure in forming connections.
Our goal is to understand the properties of the equi-
librium networks formed in this game. Our first
result concerns the edge density of equilibrium net-
works. A network connection increases both the
likelihood of remaining connected to other agents
after an attack as well the likelihood of getting
infected by a cascading spread of infection. We
show that the latter concern primarily prevails and
any equilibrium network in our game contains only
O(n log n) edges where n denotes the number of
agents. On the other hand, there are equilibrium
networks that contain Ω(n) edges showing that our
edge density bound is tight up to a logarithmic fac-
tor. Our second result shows that the presence of
attack and its spread through a cascade does not
significantly lower social welfare as long as the net-
work is not too dense. We show that any non-trivial
equilibrium network with O(n) edges has Θ(n2)
social welfare, asymptotically similar to the social
welfare guarantee in the game without any attacks.
1 Introduction
We study a network formation game where strategic agents
(vertices on a graph) receive both benefits and costs from
forming connections to other agents. While various benefit
functions exist in the literature [2, 6], we focus on the reach-
ability network benefit. Here, the benefit of an agent is the
size of her connected component in the collectively formed
graph. This models settings where reachability (rather than
centrality) motivates joining the network, e.g. when transmit-
ting packets over technological networks such as the Internet.
Most previous works feature a direct edge cost ce > 0
for forming a link. Goyal et al. [8] depart from this notion
by studying a game where forming links introduces an ad-
ditional indirect cost by exposing agents to contagious net-
work shocks. These indirect costs can model scenarios such
as virus spread through technological or biological networks.
Our work continues this investigation of direct and indi-
rect connection costs. To model the indirect cost we assume
that, after network formation, an adversary attacks a single
vertex uniformly at random. The attack then kills the vertex
and spreads through the network via the independent cascade
model according to parameter p [9]. This random attack and
probabilistic spread captures the epidemiological quality of
virus spread in both biological and technological networks.
At a high level, our work is most closely related to two
previous works. Bala and Goyal [2] study a reachability net-
work game without attacks and show a sharp characterization
of equilibrium networks: every tree and the empty network
can form in equilibria. Goyal et al. [8] study a reachabil-
ity network formation game where an adversary inspects the
formed network and then deliberately attacks a single vertex
in the network. The attack then spreads deterministically to
neighboring vertices according to a known rule, while agents
may immunize against the attack for a fixed cost. Our game
is most similar to the latter setting under a random adver-
sary and high immunization cost. However, in our setting at-
tacks spread probabilistically (through independent cascades)
rather than deterministically. This yields an arguably more
realistic model of infection spread but incurs additional com-
plexity: computing the expected connectivity benefit of an
agent in a given network is now #P-complete [12].
Goyal et al. [8] show that while more diverse equilibrium
networks, including ones with multiple cycles, can emerge
in addition to trees and the empty graph, the equilibrium
networks with n agents will have at most 2n − 4 edges;
less than twice the number of edges that can form in the
equilibria of the attack-free game. Furthermore, they show
that the social welfare is at least n2 − o(n5/3) in non-trivial
equilibrium networks. Asymptotically, this is the maxi-
mum welfare possible which is achieved in any nonempty
equilibrium of the attack-free game. In the regime where
the cost of immunization is high, the game of Goyal et al.
[8] only admits disconnected and fragmented equilibrium
networks due to deterministic spread of the attack, and the so-
cial welfare of the resulting networksmay be as low asΘ(n).
Our Results and Techniques In our game, computing util-
ities or even verifying network equilibrium is computation-
ally hard. We circumvent this difficulty by proving structural
properties for equilibrium networks. First, we provide an up-
per bound on the edge density in equilibria.
Theorem 1 (Statement of Theorem 3). Any equilibrium net-
work on n vertices has O (n logn/p) edges.
For constant p this upper bound is tight up to a logarithmic
factor. The possibility of over-building therefore differenti-
ates our game from those of Bala and Goyal [2] and Goyal et
al. [8], but the extent of over-building is limited.
To prove Theorem 1, we first show that any equilibrium
network with more than Ω(n log(n/p)) edges contains an in-
duced subgraph with large minimum cut size. We then show
that if a network has large minimum cut size, in every at-
tack (with high probability), either almost all vertices in the
network will die or almost all vertices in the network will
survive. As a result, any vertex in the induced subgraph can
beneficially deviate by dropping an edge. Together, these ob-
servations allows us to prove the claimed edge density bound.
Next, we show that any equilibrium network that is non-
trivial (i.e. contains at least one edge) also contains a large
connected component. Moreover, as long as the network is
not too dense, it achieves a constant approximation to the best
welfare possible of the attack-free game.
Theorem 2 (Informal Statement of Theorems 5 and 6). Any
non-trivial equilibrium network over n vertices contains a
connected component of size at least n/3. Furthermore, if
the number of edges in the network isO(n/p), then the social
welfare is Ω(n2).
To prove Theorem 2, we first show that any agent in a small
connected component can increase her connectivity benefits
by purchasing an edge to a larger component without signifi-
cantly increasing her attack risk. This implies the existence of
a large connected component. We then use the large compo-
nent to argue that when the equilibrium network is sparse, the
surviving network post-attack still contains a large connected
component. This guarantees large social welfare.
While Goyal et al. [8] show robustness of the structural
properties of the original reachability game of Bala and Goyal
[2] to a variation with attack, deterministic spread and the
option of immunization for players, we show robustness in
another variant that involves a cascading attack but disallows
immunization. However, on the technical front, the tools that
we use to prove these robustness results are very different
from the analysis of both of these previous games.
OrganizationWe introduce ourmodel and discuss the related
work in Section 2. In Section 3 we present examples of equi-
librium networks of our game. Sections 4 and 5 are devoted
to the characterization of the edge density and social welfare.
We conclude with directions for future work in Section 6.
2 Model
We start by formalizing our model and borrow most of our
notation and terminology from Goyal et al. [8]. We assume
the n vertices of a graph (network) correspond to individual
players. Each player has the choice to purchase edges to other
players at a fixed cost of ce > 0 per edge. Throughout we
assume that ce is a constant independent of n. Furthermore,
we use the term high probability to refer to probability at least
1− o(1/n) henceforth.
A (pure) strategy si ⊆ [n] for player i consists of a subset
of players to whom player i purchased an edge. We assume
that edge purchases are unilateral i.e. players do not need
approval to purchase an edge to another player but that the
connectivity benefits and risks are bilateral.1
Let s = (s1, . . . , sn) denote the strategy profile for all the
players. Fixing s, the set of edges purchased by all the players
induces an undirected graph. We denote a game graph as a
graph G, where G = (V,E) is the undirected graph induced
by the edge purchases of all players.
Fixing a game graph G, the adversary selects a single ver-
tex v ∈ V uniformly at random to start the attack. The attack
kills v and then spreads according to the independent cascade
model with probability p ∈ (0, 1) [9].2 In the independent
cascade model, in the first round, the attack spreads indepen-
dently killing each of the neighbors of the initially attacked
vertex v with probability p. In the next round, the spread
continues from all the neighbors of v that were killed in the
previous round. The spread stops when no new vertex was
killed in the last round or when all the vertices are killed.
The adversary’s attack can be alternatively described as
follows. Fixing a game graph G, let G[p] denote the random
graph obtained by retaining each edge of G independently
with probability p. The adversary picks a vertex v uniformly
at random to start the attack. The attack kills v and all the
vertices in the connected component of G[p] that contains v.
LetCCi(v) denote the expected size of the connected com-
ponent of player i post-attack to a vertex v and we define
CCv(v) to be 0. Then the expected utility (utility for short)
of player i in strategy profile s denoted by ui(s) is precisely
ui(s) =
1
|V |
∑
v∈V
CCi (v)− |si|ce.
We refer to the sum of utilities of all the players playing a
strategy profile s as the social welfare of s.
Wang et al. [12] show that computing the exact spread of
the attack in the independent cascade model is #P-complete
in general. This implies that, given a strategy profile s, com-
puting the expected size of the connected component of all
1As an example of a scenario where the consequences are bilat-
eral even though the link formation is unilateral, consider the spread
of a disease in a social network where the links are formed as a result
of physical proximity of individuals. The social benefits and poten-
tial risks of a contagious disease are bilateral in this case although
the link formation as a result of proximity is unilateral. We leave the
study of the bilateral edge formation for future work.
2Throughout we assume that p is a constant independent of the
number of players n. We discuss the regime in which p decreases as
the number of players increases in Section 4.1.
vertices (and hence the expected utility of all vertices) is #P-
complete. However, an approximation of these quantities can
be obtained by Monte Carlo simulation.
We model each of the n players as strategic agents who
deterministically choose which edges to purchase. A strat-
egy profile s is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if, for any
player i, fixing the behavior of the other players to be s−i,
the expected utility for i, ui(s), cannot strictly increase when
playing any strategy s′i over si. We focus our attention to
pure strategy Nash equilibrium (or equilibrium) in this work.
Since computing the expected utilities in our game is #P-
complete, even verifying that a strategy profile is an equi-
librium is #P-complete. Hence as our main contribution, we
prove structural properties for the equilibrium networks re-
gardless of this computational barrier.
2.1 Related Work
There are two lines of work closely related to ours. First, Bala
and Goyal [2] study the attack-free version of our game. They
show that equilibrium networks are either trees or the empty
network. Also since there is no attack, the social welfare in
nonempty equilibrium networks is asymptotically n2−o(n2).
Second, Goyal et al. [8] study a network formation game
where players in addition to having the option of purchasing
edges can also purchase immunization from the attack. Since
we do not study the effect of immunization purchases in our
game, our game corresponds to the regime of parameters in
their game where the cost of immunization is so high that
no vertex would purchase immunization in equilibria. More-
over, they study several different adversarial attack models
and our attack model coincides with their random attack ad-
versary. The main difference between our work and theirs
is that they assume the attack spreads deterministically while
we assume the attack spreads according to the independent
cascade model [9]. In many real world scenarios e.g. the
spread of contagious disease over the network of people, the
spread is not deterministic. Hence our work can be seen as a
first attempt to make the model of Goyal et al. [8] closer to
real world applications. However, the change in the spread
of attack comes with a significant increase in the complex-
ity of the game as even computing the utilities of the play-
ers in our game is #P-complete. While Friedrich et al. [7]
have shown that best responses for players can be computed
in polynomial time under various attack models, the question
of whether best response dynamics converges to an equilib-
rium network is open in the model of Goyal et al. [8].
Similar to Goyal et al. [8] we show that diverse equilib-
rium networks can form in our game. While they show that
all equilibrium networks over n ≥ 4 players have at most
2n− 4 edges, we show that the number of edges in any equi-
librium network is at most O(n log n) and this bound is tight
up to a logarithmic factor. Furthermore, Goyal et al. [8] show
that the social welfare is asymptotically n2 − o(n2) in non-
trivial equilibrium networks. Their definition of non-trivial
networks requires the network to have at least one immu-
nized vertex and one edge. In the regime where the cost of
immunization is high, the game of Goyal et al. [8] only ad-
mits disconnected and fragmented equilibrium networks due
to the deterministic spread of the attack. Such networks (even
excluding the empty graph) can have social welfare as low as
Θ(n). We show that any low density equilibrium network
of our game enjoys a social welfare of Θ(n2) as long as the
network contains at least one edge.
Kliemann [11] introduced a network formation game with
reachability benefits and an attack on the formed network that
destroys exactly one link with no further spread. Their equi-
librium networks are sparse and also admit high social wel-
fare as removing an edge can create at most two connected
components. Kliemann et al. [10] extend this to allow attacks
on vertices while focusing on swapstable equilibria.
Blume et al. [3] introduce a network formation game with
bilateral edge formation. They assume both edge and link
failures can happen simultaneously but independent of the
failures so far in the network. These differences make it hard
to directly compare the two models. They show a tension be-
tween optimal and stable networks and exploring such prop-
erties in depth in our model is an interesting direction.
Finally, network formation games, with a variety of dif-
ferent connectivity benefit models, have been studied exten-
sively in computer science see e.g. [2, 3, 11]. We refer the
reader to the related work section of Goyal et al. [8] for a
comprehensive summary of other related work especially on
the topic of optimal security choices for networks.
3 Examples of Equilibrium Networks
In this section we show that a diverse set of topologies can
emerge in the equilibrium of our game. Similar to the models
of Bala and Goyal [2] and Goyal et al. [8] the empty graph
can form in the equilibrium of our game when ce ≥ 1. More-
over, similar to both models, trees can form in equilibria (See
the left panel of Figure 1). Finally, while Goyal et al. [8] show
that in the regime of their game where the cost of immuniza-
tion is high (so no vertex would immunize) no connected net-
work can form in equilibria due to the deterministic spread of
the attack, we show that connected networks indeed can form
in the equilibria of our game (See Figure 1).
Figure 1: From left to right: hub-spoke, cycle and linear-paths net-
work. A directed arrow determines the vertex that purchases the
edge. We omit the details of the regime of parameters (ce and p) in
which such networks can form in the equilibria of our game.
We remark that pure strategy equilibria exist in all param-
eter regimes of our game. When ce ≥ 1, the empty net-
work can form in equilibria for all p. When ce < 1 a cy-
cle or two disconnected hub-spoke structure of size n/2 can
form in equilibria depending on whether p is far or close to 1
((1− ω(1/n)) and (1− o(1)), respectively).
Examples in Figure 1 show that denser networks can form
in equilibria compared to the model of Bala and Goyal [2] and
the high immunization cost regime of the model of Goyal et
al. [8]. So it is natural to ask how dense equilibrium networks
can be. We study this question in Section 4 and show an
upper bound of O(n log n) on the density of the equilibrium
networks. Since the examples in Figure 1 have Θ(n) edges,
our upper bound is tight up to a logarithmic factor.
Moreover, while all the equilibrium networks in Figure 1
are connected, there might still exist equilibrium networks in
our game that are highly disconnected. In Section 5 we show
that any equilibrium network with at least one edge contains
a large connected component. However, even with the guar-
antee of a large connected component, there might still be
concerns that the equilibrium networks can become highly
fragmented after the attack. In Section 5 we show that as
long as the equilibrium network is not too dense, the social
welfare is lower bounded by Θ(n2) i.e. a constant fraction of
the social welfare achieved in the attack-free game.
We obtain these structural results even tough we cannot
compute utilities nor even verify that an equilibrium has
reached due to computational barriers. We view these results
as are our most significant technical contributions.
4 Edge Density
We now analyze the edge density of equilibrium networks.
Theorem 3. Any equilibrium network on n vertices has
O (n logn/p) edges.
The proof of Theorem 3 is due to the following observa-
tions which we formally state and prove next. At a high level,
we first show that if G has large enough edge density, then G
contains an induced subgraphH whose minimum cut size is
large. We then show a large minimum cut size implies that
H [p] is connected with high probability. This means that in
almost all attacks that infect a vertex in H , all vertices in H
will get infected. So a vertex inH would have a beneficial de-
viation in the form of dropping an edge; which contradicts the
assumption that G was an equilibrium network. This proves
that equilibrium networks cannot be too dense.
More formally, we first show in Lemma 1 that ifG is dense
enough it contains a subgraph H with a minimum cut size,
denoted by α(H), of at least Ω (logn/p).
Lemma 1. Let G = (V,E) be a graph on n vertices. There
exists a constant k such that if |E| ≥ kn logn/p then G con-
tains an induced subgraphH with α(H) ≥ k logn/p.
Proof. If α(G) ≥ k logn/p thenG is the desired graph. Oth-
erwise, there is a cut of size less than k log n/p that partitions
G into two graphs G1 and G2. Repeat this process at G1 and
G2, and build a decomposition tree T in this manner. Any
leaf of this tree T is either a singleton vertex or a graph where
the minimum cut size is at least k log n/p. If at least one leaf
in T satisfies the latter property, then we are done and this is
our desired graphH . We now argue that it can not be the case
that all leaf vertices in T are singletons.
To see this, note that there can be at most n − 1 internal
vertices in T and each internal vertex in T corresponds to
removing up to k logn/p edges from G. Thus the decompo-
sition process removes at most k(n − 1) logn/p edges. On
the other hand, G has at least kn logn/p edges. It follows
that not all leaves of T can be singleton vertices.
We then show that if α(G) is Ω (logn/p) then with high
probabilityG[p] is connected.
Lemma 2 (Alon [1]). Let G = (V,E) be a graph on n ver-
tices. Then for any constant b > 0 there exists a constant
k(b) such that if α(G) ≥ k(b) logn/p then with probability
at least 1− n−b, G[p] is connected.3
We now define a property which we call almost certain
infection and show that no equilibrium network can contain
an induced subgraph satisfying this property.
Definition 1. Let G = (V,E) be a graph on n vertices and
let H be a subgraph of G on more than one vertex. H has
the almost certain infection property if whenever any vertex
inH is attacked, then with probability at least 1−o(1/n) the
attack spreads to every vertex in H .
Lemma 3. Let G = (V,E) be an equilibrium network on
n vertices. G cannot contain an induced subgraph H =
(V ′, E′) such thatH satisfies the almost infection property.
Proof. Consider any equilibrium graphG that violates the as-
sertion of the claim. LetH be an induced subgraph ofG with
the almost certain infection property. We first prove that H
contains a cycle. Assume by the way of contradiction that H
does not have a cycle, so H is a collection of trees. Let u be
any leaf in H . Then u is incident to at most one edge in H .
Therefore, with probability 1− p, this edge is not inG[p] and
u is not connected to any other vertices in G[p]. SoH cannot
have the almost certain infection property (Recall that we as-
sumed p is a constant independent of the number of players
n). This means that H contains a cycle C. Let (u, v) be an
edge on the cycle C. Assume without loss of generality that
u purchased the edge (u, v).
Now let ξ be the event that an attack propagates to some
vertex in H after the attack. Then conditioned on ξ, with
probability at least 1 − o(1/n), all vertices in H die. Hence
vertex u inH has negative utility. On the other hand, if ξ does
not occur, then the utility of u remains unchanged even if we
remove the edge (u, v). Thus vertex u can strictly improve
her utility in this case by dropping the edge (u, v). A contra-
diction to the fact that G is an equilibrium network.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. Assume by way of contradiction that G
has more than kn logn/p edges where k is the constant in
Lemma 1. Then by Lemma 1, G contains a subgraph H =
(V ′, E′) such that α(H) ≥ k logn/p. Since |E′| ≥ |V ′|,
by Lemma 2, H has the almost certain infection property.
However, G cannot be an equilibrium network by Lemma 3.
The most interesting regime for the probability of spread
p is when p is a constant independent of n. While the upper
bound in Theorem 3 holds for all p, it becomes vacuous as
p gets small i.e. it becomes bigger than the trivial bound of
3The statement in Alon [1] requires α(G[p]) ≥ k(b) log n.
Since α(G[p]) = α(G)p this translates to the condition stated in
Lemma 2.
n2/2 when p ≤ k logn/n for constant k. In Section 4.1
we analyze the edge density of equilibrium networks in the
regime where p < 1/n. We show that the number of edges in
any equilibrium network is bounded by O(n) in this regime.
To prove the density result we utilize properties of the Galton-
Watson branching process and random graphmodel of Erdo¨s-
Re´nyi, as well as tools from extremal graph theory.
4.1 Small p Regime
In this section we focus on the regime where p < 1/n and
prove the following upper bound on the edge density.
Theorem 4. Let p = κ/n for some constant κ < 1. Let
G = (V,E) be an equilibrium network over n vertices. Then
for sufficiently large n, |E| ≤ max{1/ce, 24000}n.
We prove Theorem 4 by contradiction and show that if the
equilibrium graph has more than max{1/ce, 24000}n edges,
there exists a beneficial deviation in the form of dropping an
edge for one of the players.
In order to prove Theorem 4, we need structural results
stated in Lemmas 4 and 5. First, consider an edge (u, v)
purchased by vertex u. Purchasing this edge would not have
increased the connectivity benefit of u unless, after some at-
tack, the edge (u, v) is the only path connecting u to v (and
possibly other vertices that are only reachable through v). In
Lemma 4 (which we will prove later) we show that if a graph
is dense enough, then there exists an edge (u, v) such that
many vertices should be deleted in order to make (u, v) the
only remaining path connecting u and v.
Lemma 4. Let G = (V,E) be a graph on n > 3γ vertices
with |E| ≥ 2.5γ(n− γ)− 1 for some γ ∈ N. Then there exist
two vertices v1 and v2 ∈ V such that (v1, v2) ∈ E, and at
least γ + 1 vertices need to be deleted so that the only path
from v1 to v2 in G is through the direct edge (v1, v2).
Second, as described in Section 2, the number of ver-
tices that are killed in any attack is the size of the connected
component in G[p] that contains the initially attacked vertex.
Lemma 5 (which we will prove later) bounds the size of a
randomly chosen connected component in G[p].
Lemma 5. Let G = (V,E) be an equilibrium network over
n vertices with |E| = kn and max{1/ce, 24000} ≤ k =
O(log n). When p < 1/n and n is sufficiently large, the size
of the connected component of a randomly chosen vertex v in
G[p] is at most k/3 with probability at least 1− 2ce/(3n).
We now give the formal proof of Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4. Assume by way of contradiction that
G is an equilibrium network with kn edges where k >
max{1/ce, 24000}. Let γ = ⌊k/2.5⌋, we have kn >
2.5γ(n−γ)−1. By Lemma 4, there exists an edge (u, v) such
that in order to make (u, v) the only remaining path connect-
ing u and v, we need to delete at least γ+1 vertices. Without
loss of generality assume that u has purchased the edge (u, v).
If in any attack at most γ vertices are killed, u will not lose
any connectivity benefit after dropping this edge but decrease
her expenditure by ce.
Consider the size of the largest connected component in
G[p]. Since κ < 1, the size of the largest connected compo-
nent inG[p] is at most β logn with probability 1−o(1/n) for
sufficiently large constant β which only depends on κ. When
G is the complete graph, G[p] corresponds to the random
graph generated by the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi model. In such case, the
size of the largest component of G[p] is O(log n), with high
probability, when pn = κ < 1 [5].
If γ > β logn, then with probability at most o(1/n), the at-
tack kills more than γ vertices, in which case the connectivity
benefit of u can decrease by at most n after dropping the edge
(u, v). So the expected connectivity benefit of u decreases by
at most o(1) after the deviation but her expenditure also de-
creases by ce. Hence, after the deviation, the expected change
in the utility of u is at least ce − o(1) > 0 which contradicts
the assumption that G is an equilibrium network (recall that
we have assumed ce is a constant independent of n).
If γ ≤ β logn, then by definition, k = O(log n). Since k
is also at least max{24000, 1/ce}, by Lemma 5, with proba-
bility at least 1 − 2ce/(3n), the attack kills at most k/3 < γ
vertices, in which case the connectivity benefit of u remains
unchanged after dropping the edge (u, v). With probability
at most 2ce/(3n), more than k/3 vertices are killed in which
case the connectivity benefit of u can decrease by at most
n. So the expected connectivity benefit of u decreases by
at most 2ce/3 after the deviation but her expenditure also de-
creases by ce. Hence, after the deviation, the expected change
in the utility of u is at least ce/3 > 0, which contradicts the
assumption that G is an equilibrium network.
We now proceed to prove Lemmas 4 and 5.
Proof of Lemma 4. Assume by way of contradiction that G
is the graph with smallest number of vertices such that G has
n > 3γ vertices and at least 2.5γ(n−γ)−1 edges. Therefore,
G has two vertices v1 and v2 ∈ V such that (v1, v2) ∈ E
and there exists a vertex set S ⊂ V with at most γ vertices,
such that after deleting S the only path from v1 to v2 in G is
through the edge (v1, v2). If S has less than γ vertices, then
we add arbitrary vertices from V (but not v1 or v2) to S so
that S has exactly γ vertices (we can always do so becauseG
has more than 3γ vertices).
Consider the graph where the edge (v1, v2) and the ver-
tices in S are removed, v1 and v2 are not connected in this
graph. Let C1 be the connected component that contains v1
and C2 = V \S \C1. By definition, (v1, v2) is the only edge
between C1 and C2 in G.
Define two graphs G1 = (V1, E1) and G2 = (V2, E2) as
subgraphs of G induced by C1 ∪ S and C2 ∪ S. SupposeG1
has n1 vertices and G2 has n2 vertices where γ + 1 ≤ n1 ≤
n−1 and γ+1 ≤ n2 ≤ n−1. Also without loss of generality
assume n1 ≥ n2. We have that n1+n2 = n+γ. On the other
hand,G1 andG2 have at least 2.5γ(n1+n2− 2γ)− 2 edges
in total (any edge which is not (v1,v2) is either in G1 or G2).
So either G1 has at least 2.5γ(n1 − γ) − 1 edges or G2 has
at least 2.5γ(n2 − γ) − 1 edges. Also by the property of G,
for any pair of vertices v′1, v
′
2 ∈ V1 (or v
′
1, v
′
2 ∈ V2) such that
(v′1, v
′
2) ∈ E1 (or (v
′
1, v
′
2) ∈ E2) we only need to delete at
most γ vertices so that the only path from v′1 to v
′
2 is through
the direct edge (v′1, v
′
2).
We claim that there exists a graph G′ (which is either G1
orG2) with n
′ > 2γ vertices that has at least 2.5γ(n′−γ)−1
edges. Note that if G1 has at least 2.5γ(n1 − γ) − 1 edges
then we are done since n1 ≥ n2 and n1 + n2 > 4γ imply
that n1 > 2γ. So supposeG1 has less than 2.5γ(n1 − γ)− 1
edges. Therefore, G2 has at least 2.5γ(n2 − γ) − 1 edges.
Again if n2 > 2γ we are done so suppose n2 ≤ 2γ. Consider
the edges which are in G2 but not in G1. These edge have at
least one endpoint in C2, so there are at most
(n2 − γ)(n2 − γ − 1)
2
+ γ(n2 − γ) < (n2 − γ)(
n2
2
+
γ
2
)
≤
3γ
2
(n2 − γ)
≤ 2.5γ(n2 − γ)− 1
such edges. But this would imply G1 has at least 2.5γ(n1 −
γ)− 1.
If G′ has strictly more than 3γ vertices, it contradicts our
assumption that G is the smallest graph with the property
stated in the lemma. If G′ has at most 3γ vertices, then G′
has at most
n′(n′ − 1)
2
=
(n′ − 2γ)(n′ + 2γ)
2
+ 2γ2 −
n′
2
≤ 2.5γ(n′ − 2γ) + 2γ2 −
n′
2
< 2.5γ(n′ − γ)− 1
edges, which is a contradiction.
Before proving Lemma 5, let us introduce some notation.
Let H ⊆ V be the set of vertices in G with degree at least
n3/4. Also let L = V \ H be the set of vertices in G with
degree strictly less than n3/4. Hence,H and L correspond to
vertices with high and low degrees in G, respectively. Recall
thatG[p] is a random graph where each edge ofG is sampled
independently to be retained inG[p]with probability p. Using
H and L, the creation of G[p] can be describe as a three step
sampling process. In the first step, edges with both endpoints
in H are sampled to be retained. In the second step, edges
with both endpoints in L are sampled to be retained. Finally,
in the third step, edges with one endpoint in H and the other
endpoint in L are sampled to be retained.
In Lemma 6, we first show that with high probability the
size of the largest connected component created by the first
step and second step of the sampling process is at most 5 and
12, respectively. These connected components can then be
connected together in the third step of the sampling to cre-
ate larger connected components in G[p]. We show that with
high probability, the third step would not connect more than 3
of the connected components of high degree vertices (which
were created in the first step). This implies that the number
of high degree vertices in any connected component of G[p]
is at most 15 with high probability.
We then show in Lemma 7 that for any α > 0.001, the
expected number of vertices with at least αk edges in G[p]
is at most ce/(2
1200αk). We then use the structural results
of Lemma 6 and 7 to show that with probability at least 1 −
2ce/(3n), the size of the connected component of a randomly
chosen vertex in G[p] is at most k/3 .
Lemma 6. Let G = (V,E) be an equilibrium network over
n vertices with |E| = kn with k ≥ 24000 and k = O(log n).
Suppose p < 1/n and n is sufficiently large. Then, with prob-
ability at least 1−o(1/n), (1) the connected components gen-
erated in the first step and the second step of the sampling
process of creating G[p] have size at most 5 and 12, respec-
tively and (2) no component inG[p] has more than 15 vertices
from the set H .
Proof. Recall that in the first two steps of creating the G[p],
we sample edges to retain independently with probability p
from the graphs induced by onlyH andL, respectively. Since
|E| = kn the number of high degree vertices is at most
O˜(n1/4) (where the notation O˜ hides logarithmic dependen-
cies on n). So any vertex in the graph induced by H has
degree at most O˜(n1/4). Moreover, by definition, the ver-
tices in the graph induced by L have degree at most n3/4.
By Corollary 1 (in Appendix A), with high probability, the
random components formed by the first step and second step
of the sampling process have size at most 5 and 12, respec-
tively. We refer to the set of the components of G[p] that are
formed by step one and two of the sampling by C1 and C2,
respectively.
Consider a component C2 ∈ C2. The probability that
there is an edge in G between any vertex in C2 and a spe-
cific high degree vertex is bounded by 12/n. This means
that the probability that the vertices in C2 are connected to
more than one high degree vertex is at most
(
|H|
2
)
(12/n)2 =
O˜(n−1.5). Similarly the probability that the vertices inC2 are
connected to more than two high degree vertices is at most(
|H|
3
)
(12/n)3 = o(n−2). Therefore, with high probability,
there is no component C2 ∈ C2 that is connected to three
high degree vertices. Moreover, the probability that there are
three connected components in C2 that is connected to 2 high
degree vertices is at most
(
n
3
)
(O˜(n−1.5))3 = o(n−1).
In the third step of creating the G[p], components from C1
and C2 would become connected by sampling the edges in
between H and L. As we showed there are most two com-
ponents in C1 that will be connected in the G[p] by the edges
sampled in the third step. This means, with high probability,
no component in G[p] will include more than 3 components
from C1; so, with high probability, no component in G[p] has
more than 15 high degree vertices.
Lemma 7. Let G = (V,E) be an equilibrium network over
n vertices with |E| = kn and k ≥ max{24000, 1/ce}. For
any α > 0.001, when p < 1/n, the expected number of ver-
tices that have at least αk adjacent edges in G[p] is at most
ce/(2
1200αk) for sufficiently large n.
Proof. For a vertex with degree d > αk, the probability that
she has αk edges in G[p] is at most
(
d
αk
)
n−αk < (
de
nαk
)αk <
d
n
(
e
αk
)αk
<
d
n
· 8−αk ≤
d
n
· 2−2αk · 2−24000α
<
d
n
· k−3 · 2−24000α <
d
n
·
ce
2k2
2−1200α.
The first inequality is due to Stirling’s formula. Other in-
equalities are due to kα ≥ 24, k ≥ max{24000, 1/ce} and
e/(αk) < 1/8. Adding up the probabilities for all the ver-
tices (using linearity of expectation) and using the fact that
the sum of the degrees of all the vertices is 2kn will conclude
the proof.
We now have all the background to prove Lemma 5.
Proof of Lemma 5. If we randomly choose a vertex v, the
probability that the connected component of v in G[p] has
size at least k/3 is upper bounded by 1/n times the sum of
the sizes of components with size at least k/3 in G[p]. This
is in turn upper bounded by
1
n
n∑
i=1
(i+ 1)
k
3
(xi − xi+1) <
1
n
n∑
i=1
kxi,
where xi is the number of components with size at least ik/3.
Recall that we partitioned the vertices of G into high and
low degree vertex sets H and L based on the degree. We
described a three step sampling process for creating G[p]
and referred to the set of connected components of G[p]
that are formed by step one and two of the sampling by
C1 and C2, respectively. Let ξ be the event such that each
C2 ∈ C2 has at most 12 vertices and each component in
G[p] has at most 15 high degree vertices. By Lemma 6,
Pr[ξ¯] = 1 − Pr[ξ] = o(1/n). Let yi be the number of
vertices with at least ik/600 edges in G[p]. By Lemma 7,
E[yi] ≤ ce/(2
2ik) ≤ ce/(2
i+1k).
Fix a component ofG[p]. Conditioned on event ξ, if all the
high degree vertices in the component have degree at most
ik/600, then each high degree vertex is connected to at most
ik/600 of the components in C2. So the size of this compo-
nent is at most 15·12·(ik/600)+15 = 3ik/10+15 < (ik/3).
Therefore, each component with size at least ik/3 contains at
least one vertex with at least ik/600 adjacent edges in G[p].
This means that E[xi|ξ] ≤ E[yi|ξ]. So
E[xi|ξ] ≤ E[yi|ξ] =
E[yi]− E[yi|ξ¯]Pr[ξ¯]
Pr[ξ]
≤
E[yi]
Pr[ξ]
≤
ce
(2i+1k)(1 − o(1/n))
=
ce
2i+1k
· (1 + o(1/n)).
So the probability that v is in a component of size at least
k/3 given ξ is
1
n
E[
n∑
i=1
kxi|ξ] ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
kE[xi|ξ]
= (1 + o(1/n))
1
n
n∑
i=1
ce
2i+1
= (1 + o(1/n))
ce
2n
.
So the overall probability that a vertex is in a component
with size at least k/3 is at most (1+o(1/n))ce/(2n)+Pr[ξ¯] <
2ce/(3n).
5 Social Welfare
In this section we provide a lower bound on the social welfare
of equilibrium networks. Similar to other reachability games,
the empty graph can form in equilibrium [2, 8]. Hence with-
out any further assumptions, no meaningful guarantee on the
social welfare can be made. Hence, we focus on non-trivial
equilibrium networks defined as follows.
Definition 2. An equilibrium network is non-trivial if it con-
tains at least one edge.
Definition 2 rules out the empty network but it is still pos-
sible that a non-trivial equilibrium network contains many
small connected components or becomes highly fragmented
after the attack. In this section we show that none of these
concerns materialize. In particular, in Theorem 5, we first
show that any non-trivial equilibrium network contains at
least one large connected component. We then show in
Lemma 8 that when the network is not too dense, the equi-
librium network cannot become highly fragmented after the
attack. These two observations allows us to prove our social
welfare lower bound as stated in Theorem 6.
We start by showing that any non-trivial equilibrium net-
work contains a large connected component.
Theorem 5. Let G = (V,E) be a non-trivial equilibrium
network over n vertices. Then, for sufficiently large n, the
largest connected component of G has at least n/3 vertices.
Proof. Throughout we require n > max{15ce + 15c
2
e , (9 +
3ce)/2, c
2
e + 4ce + 5}. Consider two cases: (1) when G con-
tains no isolated vertices4 and (2) when G contains at least
one isolated vertex.
In the first case, assume by way of contradiction that G
has at least 4 connected components. Let C0 be a smallest
connected component in G, say of size n0. Also let C1 be a
second-smallest connected component in G, say of size n1.
By construction, n0 ≤ n1. Since C1 has at least one edge
and this edge has cost ce, the size of C1 is at least ce + 1.
Otherwise the vertex who bought this edge can improve her
utility by dropping this edge.
Consider the deviation that a vertex v in C0 adds an edge
to an arbitrary vertex in C1. We show that the increase in
the connectivity benefit of v is more than ce. If the attack
does not start at C0 or C1, which occurs with probability
(n− n0− n1)/n, then the connectivity benefit of v increases
by n1. If the attack starts at C0, then the only way for the
attack to reach C1 is through the newly added edge by v.
Hence, in this case the connectivity benefit of v does not de-
crease. Therefore, the only scenario in which the connec-
tivity benefit of v can decrease is when the attack starts at
C1 (which occurs with probability n1/n). In this case, the
connectivity benefit of v can decrease by at most n0. So the
change in the connectivity benefit of v is at least
∆ ≥
(n− n0 − n1)
n
n1 −
n1
n
n0 =
n1(n− 2n0 − n1)
n
,
after the deviation. We show that ∆ > ce which is a contra-
diction to G being an equilibrium network.
4An isolated vertex is a vertex with no incident edges.
We consider two sub-cases based on the value of n1: (1a)
n1 > 5ce and (1b) n1 ≤ 5ce. First consider case (1a) where
n1 > 5ce. Since G has at least 4 connected components, then
n0 ≤ n/4, n0 + n1 ≤ n/2 and 2n0 + n1 ≤ 3n/4. So
n1(n− 2n0 − n1) > 5ce
n
4
> cen =⇒ ∆ > ce.
Next consider case (1b) where n1 ≤ 5ce. Since n − 2n0 −
n1 ≥ n− 15ce and n1 ≥ ce + 1 then
n1(n− 2n0 − n1) ≥ (ce + 1)(n− 15ce)
= cen+ n− 15ce − 15c
2
e > cen
=⇒ ∆ > ce,
when n > 15ce + 15c
2
e .
Therefore, the deviation of adding an edge by v will in-
crease the connectivity benefit of v by strictly more than ce
which is a contradiction. So G contains at most 3 connected
components in case (1) and hence the largest connected com-
ponent of G contains at least n/3 vertices.
In case (2), we show that the largest connected component
of G contains at least n − ce − 3 vertices. Therefore, the
largest connected component of G contains at least n/3 ver-
tices when n > (9 + 3ce)/2.
Let v be an isolated vertex and letC⋆ be a largest connected
component ofG, say of size n⋆. Consider the deviationwhere
v adds an edge to an arbitrary vertex in C⋆. If the attack does
not start neither in C⋆ nor at v (which occurs with probability
(n− n⋆ − 1)/n), then the connectivity benefit of v increases
by n⋆. The only scenario in which the connectivity benefit of
v can decrease is when the attack starts at C⋆ (which occurs
with probability n⋆/n). In this case, the connectivity bene-
fit of v can decrease by at most 1. So the change ∆ in the
connectivity benefit of v after the deviation is at least
∆ ≥
(n− n⋆ − 1)
n
n∗ −
n⋆
n
=
n∗(n− n∗ − 2)
n
.
Note that ∆ ≤ ce, since G is an equilibrium network. This
implies that n∗(n − n∗ − 2) ≤ cen. To show that n
∗ >
n − ce − 3, consider the function f(x) = x(n − x − 2).
f is increasing when x ≤ (n − 2)/2 and decreasing when
x ≥ (n− 2)/2. Moreover,
f(ce + 1) = f(n− ce − 3) = (ce + 1)(n− ce + 3) > cen
when n > c2e + 4ce + 5. So f(n
∗) is always larger than
cen when ce + 1 ≤ n
∗ ≤ n − 3 − ce. Since we showed
f(n∗) = n∗(n − n∗ − 2) ≤ cen in equilibrium it most be
the case that either n∗ < ce + 1 or n
∗ > n − 3 − ce. The
former cannot happen because we assumed G is non-empty,
so C∗ must have at least one edge and therefore n∗ ≥ ce + 1.
Hence, n∗ > n− 3− ce as claimed.
We next present Lemma 8 that describes the relationship
between the expected size of the largest connected component
of G[p] and the connectivity benefits of the vertices in G.
Lemma 8. LetG = (V,E) be an equilibrium network over n
vertices. Let C be any connected component in G of size nC .
If the expected size of the largest component ofC[p] is at most
nC(1− ǫ), then the expected sum of the connectivity benefits
of the vertices in C is at least (n− nC)n
2
C/n+ ǫn
3
C/(3n).
Proof. With probability (n − nC)/n, the attack starts at a
vertex outside of C. In this case the sum of the connectivity
benefits of vertices in C is n2C (the first term in the lower
bound). Otherwise, with probability nC/n, the attack starts
at a vertex in C. We claim that in this case, the sum of the
connectivity benefits of the vertices in C is at least ǫn2C/3
(the second term in the lower bound).
To prove the claim it suffices to show that if the largest
component in C[p] has size X , then the sum of connectivity
benefits of the vertices in C is at least (nC −X)nC/3. The
claim would then follow by taking the expectation and using
the assumption of the theorem thatX = nC(1− ǫ).
Assume by way of contradiction that the sum of connec-
tivity benefits of vertices in C is less than (nC − X)nC/3.
Then there exists a connected component C0 in C[p] such
that if we delete the vertices in C0, then the sum of connec-
tivity benefits of the vertices when the attack destroys C0 is
less than (nC − X)nC/3. Suppose C0 has size n0 and we
know n0 ≤ X .
C
C0
C1 C2 C3 . . . Ck
Figure 2: The connected component C which contains components
C0, . . . , Ck.
Let C1, C2, . . . , Ck be the connected components in the
subgraph of G induced by C \ C0 and let n1, n2, . . . , nk de-
note their sizes, respectively (see Figure 2). Then by the as-
sumption on the sum of connectivity benefits of the vertices
after deleting C0, when the attack destroys C0 we have that
k∑
i=1
n2i <
(nC −X)nC
3
. (1)
If the attack starts at a vertex in a component Ci, then the
vertices in C \Ci will still remain connected. This means the
sum of connectivity benefits of the vertices in C is at least
k∑
i=1
ni
nC
(nC − ni)
2 =
k∑
i=1
ni
nC
(n2C − 2nCni + n
2
i )
≥
k∑
i=1
nCni − 2
k∑
i=1
n2i
= nC
k∑
i=1
ni − 2
k∑
i=1
n2i .
Since
∑k
i=1 ni = nC − n0 ≥ nC − X and
∑k
i=1 n
2
i <
(nC −X)nC/3 by Equation (1), the sum of the connectivity
benefits of the vertices in C is at least (nC −X)nC/3; which
is a contradiction.
Theorem 5 and Lemma 8 allow us to prove a lower bound
on the social welfare of non-trivial equilibrium networks.
Theorem 6. Let G = (V,E) be a non-trivial equilibrium
network over n vertices. For any ǫ ∈ (0, 1/8) and sufficiently
large n, if |E| < (1−2ǫ)n log(1/ǫ)/p, then the social welfare
of G is at least ǫn2/3−O(n/p).
Proof. We show the expected sum of the connectivity ben-
efits of the vertices in G is at least ǫn2/3. Subtracting
off the cumulative expenditure for edge purchases which is
|E|ce = O(n/p) then imply the statement of the theorem.
Suppose the largest connected component ofG say C∗ has
size n⋆. By Theorem 5, n⋆ ≥ n/3. We consider two cases
based on the size of n∗: (1) n⋆ ≤ (1 − 2ǫ)n and (2) n∗ >
(1− 2ǫ)n.
In case (1), where n⋆ ≤ (1− 2ǫ)n, the sum of the connec-
tivity benefits of the vertices in the largest connected compo-
nent is at least (n − n⋆)n⋆2/n. This is because with proba-
bility of (n − n⋆)/n the attack starts outside of the compo-
nent and all the vertices in the component survive; in such
case the sum of connectivity benefits of the vertices in C∗
is n⋆2. Moreover, the derivative of (n − n⋆)n⋆2/n with re-
spect to n⋆ is (−3n⋆2 + 2nn⋆)/n, which is positive when
0 < n⋆ < 2n/3 and negative when n⋆ > 2n/3. Since
n⋆ ∈ [n/3, (1− 2ǫ)n], the minimum value of (n−n⋆)n⋆2/n
should be at one of the end points which correspond to values
2n2/27 or 2ǫ(1 − 2ǫ)2n2, respectively. Both of these values
are larger than ǫn3/3 when ǫ < 1/8, which means the sum of
connectivity benefits is at least ǫn2/3 in this case.
In case (2), where n∗ > (1− 2ǫ)n, the number of edges in
the connected componentC∗ is at most n⋆ log(1/ǫ)/p (which
occurs when all the edges are in this component). Let us de-
note the vertices in C∗ by numbers from 1 to n⋆. Let di
denote the degree of vertex i. We first bound the expected
number of isolated vertices of C∗ in G[p]. A vertex becomes
isolated inG[p] if none of the edges adjacent to it are sampled
to be retained. This event occurs with probability (1 − p)di
for vertex i. So we can derive a lower bound on the expected
number of isolated vertices of C∗ in G[p] as follows.
n⋆∑
i=1
(1 − p)di ≥ n∗(1 − p)
2|E|
n⋆ > ǫn⋆,
where the first inequality is by inequality of arithmetic and
geometric means and the second inequality is by the assump-
tion that |E| < n⋆ log(1/ǫ)/p. Thus the expected size of the
largest connected component in C∗[p] is at most n∗(1 − ǫ).
We can now apply Lemma 8 to show that the expected sum
of the connectivity benefits of the vertices in C∗ is at least
ǫn⋆3
3n
+
(n− n⋆)n⋆2
n
=
n⋆2n− (1 − ǫ/3)n⋆3
n
.
This is strictly decreasing in n∗ as the derivative with respect
to n∗ is negative. So the expected sum of connectivity ben-
efits of the vertices in C∗ (and hence in G) is at least ǫn2/3
(when n⋆ = n).
Finally, we remark that unlike the models of Bala and
Goyal [2] and Goyal et al. [8], achieving a social welfare of
n2−o(n2) is impossible in our game even when restrciting to
sparse and non-trivial equilibrium networks. This is formal-
ized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. There exists a non-trivial equilibrium network
G = (V,E) over n vertices with O(n) edges such that the
social welfare of G is kn2 for k < 1.
Proof. The hub-spoke equilibrium (see Figure 1) with p =
0.6 satisfies the condition of Proposition 1 with k = 0.4.
6 Conclusions
We studied a natural network formation gamewhere each net-
work connection has the potential to both bring additional
utility to an agent as well add to her risk of being infected
by a cascading infection attack. We showed that the equilib-
ria resulting from these competing concerns are essentially
sparse and containing at most O(n log n) edges. We also
showed that any non-trivial equilibrium network in our game
achieves the highest possible social welfare of Θ(n2) when-
ever the equilibrium network has only O(n) edges.
The Price of Anarchy in our model is Θ(n). To illustrate,
consider the ce ≥ 1 regime. A central planner can built a
cycle or two disconnected hub-spoke structures of size n/2
depending on whether the probability of spread of the attack
p is low or high, respectively (and both of these structures can
also form in equilibrium). Such networks have social welfare
ofΘ(n2). However, the empty network is an equilibrium net-
work in this regime implying a Price of Anarchy of at least
Θ(n) – the worst Price of Anarchy possible. The Price of Sta-
bility in our model isΘ(1) since the social welfare is trivially
bounded by n2 and either of the two equilibrium networks
above achieve a social welfare of Θ(n2).
Our results suggest several natural questions for future
work. Our upper bound of O(n log n) is a logarithmic factor
higher than the densest equilibrium network that we can cre-
ate. Narrowing this gap is the most interesting open question.
Improving our network density upper bound to O(n) edges
would immediately imply that all non-trivial equilibrium net-
works achieve Ω(n2) social welfare. Another direction for
future work is to analyze how network density and social wel-
fare evolves when agents additionally have an option to invest
in immunization that protects them from infections.
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A Galton-Watson Branching Process
The Galton-Watson branching process was introduced by
Galton as a mathematical model for the propagation of family
names. In the process, a population of individuals (e.g. peo-
ple) evolve over discrete time n = 1, 2, . . .. Each nth gener-
ation individual (i.e. individuals who are produced at time n)
produce a random number of individuals (called offsprings)
independently according to some distribution ξ (called the
offspring distribution) for the n+1th generation. The goal is
to study the number of individuals in the future generations.
The process can go to extinction when after n generation,
with high probability, the number of individuals in generation
n+ 1 is 0. This can happen for example when we start from
1 individual and E[ξ] < 1. In case the process goes to extinc-
tion, we are interested in characterizing how fast this happens
or how many individuals are generated before extinction.
Lemma 9 (Galton-Watson process [4]). Let ξ denote the off-
spring distribution of each individual in the Galton-Watson
process when starting with one individual. Furthermore, let
h = supθ≥0{θ − logE[e
θξ]}. Let T denote the set of of to-
tal individuals created by process when the process goes to
extinction. Then Pr[|T | > k] ≤ e−kh for all k ∈ N.
Corollary 1. Let ǫ > 0 and n ∈ N. In the Galton-Watson
process, suppose the offspring distribution ξ is the sum of
m = O(n1−ǫ) Bernoulli random variables with probability
at most 1/n. Then with probability at least 1 − o(n−2), the
number of individuals created by the process is at most 3/ǫ.
Proof.
E[eθξ] =
m∑
i=1
Pr[ξ = i]eθi ≤
m∑
i=1
1
ni
(
m
i
)
eθi ≤
m∑
i=1
mieθi
nii!
≤
m∑
i=1
(
meθ
n
)i
Let θ′ = ǫ logn− 1,
E[eθ
′ξ] ≤
m∑
i=1
(
1
e
)i ≤
e
e− 1
So
h = supθ≥0{θ − logE[e
θξ]} ≥ θ′ − E[eθ
′ξ]
≥ ǫ logn− 1−
1
e− 1
> ǫ logn− 3.
Therefore by Lemma 9,
Pr[|T | >
3
ǫ
] ≤
e9/ǫ
n3
= o(n−2),
as claimed.
